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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of contract structure (fixed versus contingent) and a
contextual factor (positive versus negative benefit surprise) on tax professionals’
behavior. Regulatory restrictions on contract structure are based on the belief that
contingent fee contracts “encourage tax return preparers to take unsupported positions on
the taxpayers’ returns” (Murphy 1989, p. 2). Experienced tax professionals participated
in an experiment investigating the effect of contract structure and benefit surprise on their
judgments and decisions. Contrary to regulators’ beliefs about the effect of contingent
fee structures, I do not find a main effect of contract structure. Rather, results show that
tax professionals who contract under a fixed fee and encounter a negative benefit surprise
are more likely to take uncertain tax positions than professionals who contract under a
contingent fee and encounter a negative benefit surprise. In contrast, participants who
contract under a fixed fee and encounter a positive benefit surprise are less likely to take
uncertain tax positions than professionals who contract under a contingent fee and
encounter a negative benefit surprise. Supplemental analysis shows that the form of this
interaction changes with the aggressiveness of the position. Results also show that tax
professionals contracting under a contingent fee are more likely to inform their client that
positions included on the tax return may not be supported if audited. The overall tenure
of the results suggests that restricting the ability of tax professionals and their clients to
allocate risk through the use of contingent fee contracts has the unintended consequence
of increasing tax professionals’ aggressiveness and decreasing the information provided
iv	
  

to taxpayers. These results are particularly important when considering the significant
influence tax professionals can have on the positions taken on their clients’ tax returns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The effect of contract structure on the behavior of contracting parties has received
attention from academics, policy-makers, professional organizations, and the media
(Frankel et al. 2002; Murphy 2012). In the academic literature, research suggests that in
an environment where outcomes are uncertain and inputs are costly to observe, contract
structure can play an important role in motivating behavior, aligning incentives, and
allocating risk between contracting parties (Eisenhardt 1989). However, contract
structure may also result in suboptimal behavior. For example, performance-based
executive compensation may cause aggressive financial reporting and be a motivating
factor in recent financial crises (Murphy 2012). This potential for suboptimal behavior
has prompted contract restrictions in executive compensation, investment banking, and
auditing and tax services (Murphy 2012). While restricting contract structure may
influence behavior, restricting contract structure may also result in unintended
consequences. This study brings initial empirical evidence to bear on how contract
structure interacts with naturally occurring contextual factors to affect tax professionals’
behavior.
Consistent with concerns in other fields that compensation contracts drive
suboptimal behavior, regulations limiting the use of contingent fees in contracts between
tax professionals and their clients are based on claims that contingent fee contracts would
“encourage tax return preparers to take unsupported positions on the taxpayers’ returns”
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(Murphy 1989, p. 2; Rostain 2006; Levin 2009; Department of the Treasury; “IRS;”
2011).1 While regulators and lawmakers assert that limiting the use of contingent fee
contracts will decrease the incidence of aggressive tax positions, the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountant’s (AICPA) Tax Practice Responsibilities Committee
(hereafter “AICPA Committee”) emphasized the importance of contextual factors when
considering the consequences of contingent fee structures (AICPA 2006). They argued
that contingent fee contract structures have been used as an important risk reduction tool
for both taxpayers and tax professionals when the “tangible value” of the tax services to
be offered is difficult to estimate (AICPA 2006, p. 13).
Despite the strongly held competing views about the effect of restrictions on
contingent fees, the sweeping restrictions on the contractual relationships between tax
professionals and their clients (i.e., the restrictions on contingent fees discussed above)
have been made in the absence of empirical evidence. This observation is important
because regulatory interference in complex economic arrangements between contracting
parties may have unanticipated or even counterproductive consequences (Smith 1776;
Merton, 1936; Sims and Herman 1996; Hanlon et al. 2008; Norton 2011).
In order to understand the effect of different contract structures on tax
professionals’ behavior, it is important to examine those structures within the context in
which they are utilized. Tax professionals operate in an environment where inputs are
costly to observe and outcomes are uncertain – for example, where the extent or cost of
tax professionals’ services are costly to observe and the benefit that the client will realize
as a result of those services may not be precisely estimable (Kadous and Magro 2001;
AICPA 2006). The efficient sharing of economic risk has been identified as an important
1

See the background section for a discussion of the history of contingent fees for tax services.
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factor in the development of the optimal contract structure (Reese 1985; Eisenhardt 1989;
Baiman 1990; and Phillips and Sansing 1998). Indeed, the AICPA Committee
emphasized the use of contingent fee contract structures as a way to allocate risk between
taxpayers and tax professionals. However, regulations and standards now restrict the use
of contingent contract structures for tax services (IRS 2011; AICPA 2011). The
experimental results reported herein suggest that, contrary to the claims of regulators and
lawmakers, the restrictions of contract structure cause suboptimal behavior by tax
professionals. Specifically, in the highly uncertain environment in which tax
professionals operate, regulations that restrict contingent fee contracts between taxpayers
and tax professionals may backfire – restrictions may actually increase the likelihood of
aggressive behavior by tax professionals.
Research has shown that taxpayers view tax professionals’ primary duties as those
of (1) resolving uncertainty and (2) minimizing the overall cost of tax compliance,
including tax liabilities and the costs related to tax services (Jackson and Milliron 1986;
Johnson 1993; Phillips and Sansing 1998). Christensen (1994) and Stephenson (2006)
suggest that tax professional’s behavior is based on perceptions of their client’s
expectations, and that tax professionals most often see their role as minimizing their
client’s tax liability. However, prior to the start of an engagement, tax professionals
cannot always perfectly predict the necessary services to be provided or the benefit that
will be realized by the taxpayer (AICPA 2006; Kadous and Magro 2001). In many
situations, an estimate of the anticipated outcome of the engagement is communicated to
the client and, in turn, influences the contract with the client (AICPA 2006; Phillips and
Sansing 1998). In addition to affecting the contract with the client, this estimate may
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serve as a reference point that the client will use to evaluate the value and quality of the
services provided by the tax professional at the conclusion of the engagement.
There are three potential results of providing a taxpayer with an estimate of the
tangible value of the tax services to be provided: (1) the benefit obtained is exactly equal
to the estimate provided (no benefit surprise); (2) the benefit obtained exceeds the
estimate provided (a positive benefit surprise); or (3) the benefit obtained is less than the
estimate provided (a negative benefit surprise). If taxpayers use the projected benefit as a
reference point, a negative benefit surprise may negatively impact their evaluation of the
tax professional. A tax professional anticipating this negative client reaction may search
for ways to increase the benefit realized by the client, including taking uncertain positions
on the tax return. I predict that a tax professional encountering a negative benefit surprise
will be more likely to include uncertain tax positions on the tax return than a tax
professional encountering a positive benefit surprise.
The reaction to a benefit surprise is important because it has significant
implications for how tax professionals behave under different contract structures. While
prior research has not identified the estimate provided to the client as a reference point
for the evaluation of the tax professional, prior research has suggested that taxpayers use
the difference between the actual outcome and the fee for services in forming their
judgments (Phillips and Sansing 1998). When the contract has been structured as a fixed
fee and there is a negative benefit surprise, the fee for services (1) consumes an
unexpectedly high fraction of any benefit actually realized and (2) results in a situation
where the client bears the entire burden of the difference between the actual outcome and
the estimate originally provided.
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In contrast, a contingent fee contract structure creates a situation where (1) the
risk that a negative benefit surprise will impact the client is shared by the tax
professional, and (2) the economic impact of the negative surprise on the taxpayer is
dampened by the reduced fee for the services provided. In this manner, a contingent fee
contract structure allows the tax professional to share the inherent risk of a negative
change in the actual, versus estimated, outcome with the taxpayer. I predict that tax
professionals’ reactions to the direction of the benefit surprise will interact with contract
structure such that a tax professional who contracts for a fixed fee and encounters a
negative benefit surprise will be more likely to include uncertain tax positions on the tax
return than a professional who contracts for a contingent fee and encounters a negative
benefit surprise.
In addition to affecting tax professionals’ propensity to include an aggressive
position on the tax return, contract structure may also affect the information provided to
the taxpayer by the tax professional. Tax professionals who engage in more aggressive
judgments to meet client expectations may feel pressure to not fully disclose their choices
to the taxpayer. Research in psychology has shown that participants will be more likely
to share negative news when the recipient of the news perceives that both parties will
share in the fate (Johnson et al. 1974). Tax professionals contracting under a contingent
fee structure share in the economic impact of the negative benefit surprise. This may
reduce the potential for the tax professional to hide the negative benefit surprise by
including uncertain tax positions on the tax return and hiding information from the
taxpayer. I predict that tax professionals contracting under a contingent fee contract
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structure will be more likely to inform the client that positions taken on the return may
not be supportable if challenged by the IRS.
I employ a 2x2 between-subjects experimental design that manipulates contract
structure (fixed versus contingent) and benefit surprise (positive versus negative). I
explore the interactive effect of these two variables on the likelihood that tax
professionals will include uncertain positions on the client’s tax return and inform the
client that uncertain positions may not be upheld if challenged. The experiment presents
a situation where a tax professional that has encountered a benefit surprise (unknown to
the taxpayer) must determine whether they will include uncertain positions on the tax
return.
Results demonstrate that contract structure interacts with benefit surprise to affect
tax professionals’ behavior. Tax professionals who contract under a fixed fee and
encounter a negative benefit surprise are more likely to include uncertain tax positions
than tax professionals who contract under a contingent fee structure and encounter a
negative benefit surprise. In contrast, tax professionals who contract under a fixed fee
contract and encounter a positive benefit surprise are less likely to include uncertain tax
positions than professionals who contract under a contingent fee and encounter a positive
benefit surprise. In addition, professionals who contract under a contingent fee are more
likely to inform their client that a position may not be sustained if challenged by the IRS.
Supplemental analysis comparing professionals’ judgments of whether a position
is likely to be upheld by a Tax Court judge to their likelihood of taking that position show
a similar pattern of results. Participants contracting under a fixed fee report a higher
(lower) likelihood of taking a position than their assessments of support for that position
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when they encounter a negative (positive) benefit surprise. Participants who contract
under a contingent fee show no significant difference between their likelihood of taking a
position and their judgments of the level of support for that position, regardless of benefit
surprise.
This study makes several contributions to the growing literature on tax
professionals’ judgments and decision-making. Results highlight the importance of
benefit surprise and the potential for that surprise to interact with contract structure to
affect professionals’ behavior. Contrary to regulators’ claims that contingent fees for tax
services will increase noncompliance, results demonstrate that restricting contingent fee
contracts actually increases the likelihood of aggressive behavior by tax professionals
when they encounter a negative benefit surprise. This increase is especially pronounced
for categories of cost that are less than 50% likely to be sustained. These results may
inform regulators about potential consequences of constraining economic interactions
between taxpayers and tax professionals. Careful consideration should be given to the
potential for contextual factors to negatively impact behavior when contract structures are
limited.
In addition, this study is the first to examine whether contract structure affects tax
professionals’ likelihood of informing taxpayers that tax return positions may not be
supported if challenged. This reduction in the amount of information provided to clients
by the tax professional may leave them unaware of aggressive positions taken on their
returns and, as a consequence, undermine a fundamental aspect of our income tax system
– the ability of taxpayers to accurately report their income. Reduced communication
between professionals and their clients may be especially significant given that taxpayers
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prefer conservative tax positions (Hite and McGill 1992) but lack the expertise required
to identify an aggressive position and have been shown to follow both conservative and
aggressive recommendations made by tax professionals (Newberry et al. 1993; Beck et
al. 1996).
The remaining discussion is organized as follows: Section II provides a brief
overview of the contingent fee contract structure debate. Section III develops the
hypotheses. Section IV describes the methodology employed. Section V describes the
experimental results. Section VI provides a discussion of the contribution and limitations
of the study, as well as suggestions for future research.
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II. BACKGROUND
Contingent Fee Contract Structure
In 1985, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated the AICPA for
illegally restricting trade by banning contingent fee contract structures (Mason 1994).2
As the two parties neared settlement, the FTC wrote a proposed settlement that would
allow contingent fees for tax services (Phillips and Sansing 1998). Before a final
agreement was reached, then-acting IRS Commissioner Murphy argued that “contingent
fee structure[s] will encourage tax return preparers to take unsupported positions on the
taxpayer's returns" (Murphy 1989, p. 2). This argument is consistent with conventional
wisdom that tax professionals contracting under a contingent fee will include aggressive
positions on their clients’ returns in order to increase their fees. In response to
Commissioner Murphy’s concern, the IRS amended Treasury Circular 230 to prohibit
contingent fees in many contexts, including the filing of an original tax return (IRS 1994,
2011). The final settlement agreement led the AICPA to issue revised ethics rules
prohibiting contingent fee contracts when the engagement was with clients for whom
attest services are performed or for the preparation of an original tax return (FTC 1989).
Despite the intent of the revised Circular 230 to decrease the incentives (and
increase the risks) associated with aggressive behavior, differences in interpretation of the
rules limited their effectiveness. The assumptions that contract structure (1) continued to
be a driving factor in accountants’ decisions to be more aggressive with their
2

See Sager (1993), Mason (1994), and Phillips and Sansing (1998) for a more thorough discussion of the
history of contingent fees for tax services.
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recommendations to clients and (2) ultimately affects the positions taken on tax returns
has kept fee structure at the forefront of the debate related to tax professionals’ behavior
(Newberry et al. 1993; Phillips and Sansing 1998; Levin 2009). In addition to the
correspondence between the AICPA Committee and the IRS, Senator Carl Levin (2009)
more recently emphasized the need to eliminate contingent fee structures for tax services
in order to curb the abusive behavior of tax professionals.
In contrast to the claimed negative influence of contingent fees on tax
professionals’ behavior, the AICPA’s Tax Practice Responsibilities Committee asserted
that there might be benefits to allowing contingent fees (AICPA 2006). The AICPA
Committee stated that contingent fees were important to the public’s perception that
representation is available to all taxpayers who have a legitimate claim against the IRS,
regardless of ability to pay.3 Further, the AICPA Committee argued that it was in the
IRS’ best interest to encourage taxpayers to avail themselves of services that would
resolve potential examination issues before a return was audited. The AICPA Committee
also asserted that when tax professionals have the ability to charge a contingent fee, they
will be more likely to accept only engagements “where the IRS’ position is open to
challenge” (AICPA 2006, p. 13), thereby increasing the overall incidence of compliance.
Stressing that fee structure should not be limited by a third party, but should be
founded on mutual trust and what the two parties (taxpayer and tax professional) agree is
most fair and will best serve their respective interests, the AICPA Committee argued that
contingent fee structures best align the interests of the taxpayer and the tax professional.
The AICPA Committee emphasized “each type of fee arrangement inherently poses
3

Restricting the use of a contingent fee essentially limits the ability to retain professional tax assistance to
those taxpayers who can afford to pay an hourly or fixed fee regardless of the outcome (AICPA 2006).
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financial risks to the practitioner, the taxpayer, or both” (AICPA 2006, p. 13). These
risks arise because it is not always possible for practitioners to determine, up front, the
extent of the services necessary or “the tangible value of such services to the taxpayer”
(AICPA 2006, p. 13). While difficult to make, this initial estimate affects the size and
type of the fee for services and serves as an important risk reduction tool for both parties
(AICPA 2006).4
The AICPA Committee’s emphasis on the importance of the tangible value of
services rendered is consistent with prior tax literature showing that (1) evaluations of tax
professionals are based primarily on the outcome of the services provided (Jackson and
Milliron 1986; Newberry et al. 1993; Phillips and Sansing 1998) and (2) tax professionals
expect to collect a larger percentage of their billable time when the client is in a tax
refund position (Jackson et al. 2005). Phillips and Sansing’s (1998) analytical model also
emphasized the importance of the benefit realized by the taxpayer relative to the amount
of the fee paid.5 Their model suggests that taxpayers would be required to pay higher
fees under a fixed (versus contingent) fee structure, which would, in turn, cause taxpayers
to be more aggressive as they attempted to realize a greater tax benefit to offset the higher
fee paid.

4

If the estimated benefit of the services is sufficient, the taxpayer and tax professional will determine the
appropriate fee for the engagement. However, if the estimated benefit of the service does not exceed a
minimal reservation price, the taxpayer will not engage the professional to provide the service. In addition
to the costs of receiving the services, taxpayers may also consider participation by client personnel, the
possibility of audit, and any uncertainty inherent in the estimate.
5
See Reinganum and Wilde (1991), Cuccia (1994), and Anderson and Cuccia (2000) for applications of
principal-agent theory to the taxpayer-tax professional relationship. See also Eisenhardt (1989) for a
review of agency literature and Baiman (1990) for a review of the use of agency theory in accounting
literature.
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III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Benefit Surprise
Client satisfaction, an important part of tax professionals’ ability to maximize
utility from their practice (Kadous and Magro 2001), has been shown to be closely linked
with the outcome of the tax services provided (Phillips and Sansing 1998). Research
reports that taxpayers view tax professionals’ primary duties as those of (1) resolving
uncertainty and (2) minimizing tax liabilities and the costs related to tax services
(Jackson and Milliron 1986; Johnson 1993; Phillips and Sansing 1998). Christensen
(1992) and Stephenson (2006) suggest that a tax professional’s behavior is based on
perceptions of the client’s expectations. These expectations may be set by the tax
professional at the beginning of the engagement.
During their discussion of factors that impact the structure and amount of the fee
for tax services, the AICPA Committee highlighted the importance and difficulty of
estimating the “tangible value” of the services to be provided to the client (AICPA 2006,
p. 13). As the engagement concludes, the initial estimate may also serve as a reference
point for the client’s evaluation of both the success of the engagement and the
competence of the tax professional (Phillips and Sansing 1998; Newberry et al. 1993).
However, a tax professional’s inability to precisely determine the tangible benefit to be
realized by the taxpayer often results in a difference between the estimated benefit
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initially communicated to the client and the actual benefit realized from the services (i.e.,
a benefit surprise).6
This benefit surprise may influence the client’s evaluation of the competence of
the tax professional and impact their evaluation of the quality and value of the services
provided (Phillip and Sansing 1998; AICPA 2006). When the actual benefit realized
from the services exceeds the reference point established at the beginning of the
engagement (i.e., a positive benefit surprise) the client will likely be pleased with the
result and, by extension, with the service provider (Newberry et al. 1993). However,
holding all else constant, a realized benefit that falls short of the initially established
reference point (i.e., a negative benefit surprise) will likely have a negative impact on the
client’s evaluation of the tax professional and the quality of the services provided, as well
as their assessment of the value of those services compared to the fee paid (Phillip and
Sansing 1998; AICPA 2006).
A desire to meet their client’s expectations may cause tax professionals
encountering a negative benefit surprise to be more likely to include uncertain tax
positions on the return in order to deliver a positive result to their client. Although
putting a client in a more aggressive position may expose them to the risk of IRS audit,
tax professionals have been shown to view that risk as negligible, and it may not weigh
heavily on their decisions (Klepper and Nagin 1989a, 1989b, Cuccia 1994). In the
presence of a negative benefit surprise, the risk of disappointing or even losing the client

6

There are three potential results of providing a taxpayer with an estimate of the tangible value of the tax
services to be provided: 1) the benefit obtained is exactly equal to the estimate provided; 2) the benefit
obtained exceeds the estimate provided (a positive benefit surprise); or 3) the benefit obtained is less than
the estimate provided (a negative benefit surprise).
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may outweigh, or be more salient than, the risk of detection posed by the IRS (Jackson
and Milliron 1986; Newberry et al. 1993).7 Formally, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Tax professionals who encounter a negative benefit surprise will
be more likely to take uncertain tax positions than tax professionals who
encounter a positive benefit surprise.
Contract Structure
The effect of a negative or positive benefit surprise may be exacerbated by the
structure of the contract between the taxpayer and tax professional. If there is a negative
benefit surprise and the contract has been structured as a fixed fee contract, the fee for
services (1) consumes a larger portion of the benefit realized and (2) results in a situation
where the client bears the entire economic burden of the difference between the actual
outcome and the estimate originally provided. Phillips and Sansing’s (1998) model of
taxpayer behavior suggests that taxpayers compare the dollar outcome of the services
provided with the amount of the fee charged for those services. Extending that same
comparison to a negative benefit surprise would suggest that taxpayers will be averse to
negative changes in the benefit of the services provided relative to the fee charged for
those services. Therefore, a tax professional that encounters a negative benefit surprise
and is providing services under a fixed fee contract may have heightened expectations
that the client will be dissatisfied. This may cause the tax professional to be even more
likely to include uncertain tax positions on the tax return in order to increase the chances
that the client is pleased.

7

While it appears that a tax professional would benefit from always underestimating the value of the
services to be provided so as to exceed the client’s expectations, often referred to as “underpromise and
overdeliver” (Trautz and Pinnington 2009, p. 12), that is not always feasible. Underestimating may cause
the client not to engage the professional in favor of someone else, or to forgo the services altogether. In
addition, repeatedly overdelivering may shift the reference point, such that the client begins to expect that
result (Trautz and Pinnington 2009).
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In contrast to a fixed fee contract structure, outcome uncertainty is implicit in a
contingent fee contract structure.8 A contingent fee contract structure creates a situation
where (1) there is no change in the relative portion of the benefit consumed by the
ultimate fee charged and (2) the economic impact of the negative surprise on the taxpayer
is lessened by the reduced fee for the services provided. This is consistent with the
argument of the AICPA Committee (2006) that a contingent fee structure would better
align the interests of the contracting parties. While a fixed fee contract may exacerbate
the likelihood of losing the client if a negative benefit surprise is encountered, a
contingent fee contract structure allows the tax professional to share the economic risk of
a negative change in the actual, versus estimated, outcome with the taxpayer and may
reduce the likelihood of losing the client. Such a reduction in the risk of losing the client
may also reduce the propensity for a tax professional contracting under a contingent fee
and encountering a negative benefit surprise to take uncertain tax positions.
While a contingent fee may reduce the pressure to include uncertain positions
when a negative benefit surprise is encountered, the same may not hold true when a
positive benefit surprise is encountered. Hypothesis 1 suggests that, when a tax
professional encounters a negative benefit surprise, the possibility of disappointing or
even losing the client may outweigh the additional risk of an IRS audit, leading tax
professionals to take aggressive positions on returns. However, when a positive benefit
surprise is encountered, the likelihood of disappointing or losing the client and the
associated reputation concerns are greatly reduced. Rather than focusing on the salience
of losing the client, the tax professional evaluating potentially aggressive decisions would
8

If the benefit could be precisely estimated, there would be no need to contract under a contingent fee
arrangement. Rather, a taxpayer who could not pay up front could pay a fixed amount after the known
benefit had been realized.
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now be making a judgment based on the riskiness of the tax position relative to the
potential gain of taking the aggressive position. Under a contingent fee contract
structure, the incremental tax benefit of taking the aggressive position would be directly
rewarded with an increase in the fee received by the tax professional. This may
encourage the tax professional to be more aggressive in their recommendations to
taxpayers, as suggested by the IRS (Murphy 1989). This incremental benefit would not
be available when contracting under a fixed fee contract. Therefore, a tax professional
contracting under a fixed fee may not be motivated to take uncertain positions. I predict
that:
Hypothesis 2a: When a negative benefit surprise is encountered, tax
professionals contracting under a fixed fee will be more likely to take uncertain
tax positions than professionals contracting under a contingent fee.
Hypothesis 2b: When a positive benefit surprise is encountered, tax professionals
contracting under a fixed fee will be less likely to take uncertain tax positions than
professionals contracting under a contingent fee structure.
Note that Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict an interaction between contract structure
and benefit surprise. The form of that interaction is shown in Figure 1.
In addition to reducing the pressure to avoid a negative benefit surprise, the direct
alignment of the taxpayer and tax professional’s financial interest, found in the context of
contingent fees, may affect the communication between the taxpayer and tax
professional. Hypotheses 1 and 2a suggest that tax professionals encountering a negative
benefit surprise may take aggressive positions on the tax return to increase the benefit to
the client, thus reducing the probability of losing the client. However, taxpayers have a
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Figure 1 – Interaction Predicted in H2a and H2b

Negative Benefit Surprise
Positive Benefit Surprise

Contingent Fee

Fixed Fee

preference for taking conservative positions on their returns, and have even reported a
desire to disengage the professional when provided with advice they identify as overly
aggressive (Hite and McGill 1992; Stephenson 2006). At the same time, taxpayers lack
the expertise required to identify an aggressive position and have been shown to follow
both conservative and aggressive recommendations made by tax professionals (Newberry
et al. 1993; Beck et al. 1996). Therefore, while a tax professional may be motivated by
contextual factors to take aggressive tax positions, informing the client that positions may
not be supported could ultimately result in losing the client.
However, a contingent fee contract structure may reduce the risk that informing
the client about uncertain positions will result in losing the client. Research in
17
	
  

psychology has shown that individuals are more likely to share negative news when the
recipient of the news perceives that both parties will share in the fate (Johnson et al.
1974). Tax professionals contracting under a contingent fee structure share in the
economic impact of the tax position, including uncertain positions taken on the return.
This alignment of interests may result in increased trust between the taxpayer and the tax
professional (AICPA 2006; Dana and Spier 1993) and reduce the pressure on the tax
professional to hide the impact of a benefit surprise (Johnson et al. 1974). Thus,
professionals contracting under a contingent fee contract structure may be more likely
than professionals contracting under a fixed fee contract structure to inform the taxpayer
that uncertain positions on the tax return may not be sustained if challenged. I
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: Tax professionals contracting under a contingent (fixed) fee will
be more (less) likely to inform the taxpayer that an uncertain tax position may not
be sustained if challenged.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
Overview
A 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design was used to examine how fee
structure (contingent versus fixed) and benefit surprise (positive versus negative) affect
tax professionals’ recommendations to clients. After reading introductory information,
48 practicing tax professionals with R&D tax credit experience were asked to determine
the likelihood that a tax professional would include uncertain positions in the calculation
of a client’s R&D tax credit. Participants then responded to supplemental, demographic,
and manipulation check questions.
Participants
All participants were experienced tax professionals from large, international firms
who specialized in providing R&D tax credit services to clients. I solicited participation
through firm representatives and direct contact with tax professionals. Participants were
emailed an invitation to participate in the study. The email contained a link to the online
instrument administered via Qualtrics. Ultimately, 48 practicing tax professionals with
R&D tax credit experience participated in the study. Participants had a mean (median)
age of 32 (31), and 8.6 (7.7) years of professional tax experience.
Participants also self-reported their familiarity with the R&D tax credit by
responding to the question, “How familiar are you with the research and development
(R&D) tax credit?” Responses were on a scale from 0-100 anchored by “NOT very
familiar” and “VERY Familiar.” The mean (median) response to the familiarity question
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was 82.0 (91.1). None of the demographic variables differed by condition and they do
not significantly affect the dependent variables. Information about participants is
included Table 1.
Task
Participants were presented with background information related to a hypothetical
tax professional and taxpayer. The tax professional is described as a high performer in
their firm, who has exceeded his billing, realization, and client development goals. The
tax professional is also told that his team has been assigned the R&D tax credit
engagement for a new client due to his tax expertise and the quality of his client
relationships. This detailed information about the tax professional is provided in order to
establish that the tax professional is reasonably competent and reduce the likelihood that
participants attribute the benefit surprise to a lack of competence on the part of the tax
professional.
The client is introduced as an S corporation in the biotechnology industry that is
just beginning to invest significant funds in activities that potentially qualify for the R&D
tax credit. The client is described as not having any employees with the expertise
necessary to calculate the R&D tax credit or capable of scrutinizing the work of a tax
professional who calculates the R&D credit on their behalf. This information is provided
so that participants have the mental freedom to include positions without concerns that
the client will second-guess their decisions. All participants are told that, prior to
engaging the professional to provide the services, the tax professional estimated that the
client’s R&D tax credit would be “about $200,000.” After providing that estimate to the
client, the client engaged the tax professional to calculate the R&D tax credit on their
behalf.
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Table 1 – Demographic Information

Variable
Age
Years of tax experience
Familiarity with R&D Tax Credit

Std.
Dev.
9.8
7.7
20.3

Mean
32.0
8.6
82.0

1st
Quartile
26.0
3.5
66.9

Median
31.0
7.0
91.1

3rd
Quartile
35.0
10.0
100.0

Participants consist of 48 tax professionals with R&D tax credit experience who responded
to an email request to participate in an online experiment. Two-thirds of the participants
who responded to the demographic questions were male.
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Contract Structure Manipulation
The manipulation of contract structure (“CONTRACT”) is communicated as
follows. In the fixed fee contract setting, participants are told that “the fee for the
engagement is structured as a fixed fee of $70,000.” In the contingent fee contract
setting, participants are told that “the fee for the engagement is structured as a contingent
fee of 35% of the final R&D tax credit.”
Benefit Surprise Manipulation
Benefit surprise (“SURPRISE”) was manipulated by telling participants that,
when reviewing the R&D tax credit calculation, the tax professional found new
information that changed the current calculated credit. Participants in the positive
(negative) benefit surprise condition were told that incorporating that information,
“results in an increase (a decrease) in the final R&D tax credit of $90,000, making the
calculated R&D tax credit $290,000 ($110,000), rather than the originally estimated
$200,000 communicated to [the client] prior to the engagement.”
Uncertain Tax Position(s)
Participants next learn that the engagement team has identified a potentially
qualifying project that has not been incorporated into the current calculation of the R&D
tax credit amount and that client’s management team has not identified it as a potentially
qualifying activity. Participants learned that the costs associated with the project are
broken into three categories, and that the support for including each category in the
calculation of the R&D tax credit varies. Participants are not provided with the level of
support for the three categories of costs. Rather, the potentially qualifying activities for
each of the three categories of cost are described in a brief narrative. Participants learn
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that including all of the costs in the calculation of the credit would increase the current
credit by $100,000. They are informed that this increase would bring the total credit
amount to $390,000 ($210,000) in the positive (negative) benefit surprise condition.9
The three categories of costs were developed with an R&D manager and partner
at one of the Big 4 firms providing participants. The descriptions were calibrated such
that the costs described in Category 1 were 55% likely to be upheld by a Tax Court judge,
the costs described in Category 2 were 35% likely to be upheld by a Tax Court judge, and
the costs described in Category 3 were 0-5% likely to be upheld by a Tax Court judge.10
Including a position with virtually no support provide the opportunity to directly explore
the IRS’s claim that contingent fees will result in professionals taking unsupportable
positions.11 In addition, differing levels of support provides the opportunity to explore
whether the effects of the independent variables on professionals’ behavior differs based
on the level of support for a position.
Dependent Measures
The dependent variables for Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b are tax professionals’
assessment of the likelihood that the tax professional “will choose to include the costs
related to [each category described] in the final calculation of the R&D tax credit?” For
each category of costs, participants responded on a scale from 0-100, with anchoring
descriptions of “Definitely WILL NOT Include” and “Definitely WILL Include.” The
9

The descriptions of each category also includes the amount that the credit will increase if that category is
added. The three categories of cost increase the credit by $32,000, $35,000, and $33,000, respectively.
10

The descriptions were then provided to three other R&D professionals at the Senior Manager/Partner
level to confirm the likelihood ratings. See supplemental testing below for an analysis of participants’
reported likelihood judgments.
11

Although the IRS has not provided percentage thresholds for most positions, Fleming and Whittenburg
(2007) state that a position that does not have at least 25% certainty will not meet the reasonable basis
criteria.
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dependent variables for Hypothesis 3 are the reported likelihoods that the tax professional
will inform the client that each category of cost may not be upheld if challenged by the
IRS. To aid in interpreting their response to that measure, I simultaneously ask
participants whether they feel the tax professional has a responsibility to inform the client
that each category of costs may not be upheld under audit.
Supplemental Measures
In addition to responding to the dependent measures, participants responded to
supplemental judgment measures and follow-up questions. Participants were asked to
select the final number that would be reported to the client. This question allowed them
to make a selection that did not include any of the uncertain categories of cost, included
only the first category, included both the first and second categories of cost, etc.
Participants then responded to process measures related to possible motivations for the
tax professional’s decision to include or exclude amounts in the credit. Next, participants
rated the likelihood that a Tax Court judge will uphold each of the three cost categories if
the R&D tax credit were selected for audit. Finally, participants responded to
manipulation checks and demographic questions.
V. RESULTS
Tests of Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicts that tax professionals experiencing a negative benefit
surprise would be more likely to include uncertain costs in the final R&D tax credit
calculation than tax professionals experiencing a positive benefit surprise. The dependent
measures used to test Hypothesis 1 are respondents’ ratings of the likelihood that the tax
professional would include the costs related to each of the three categories of uncertain

24
	
  

costs in the final calculation of the R&D tax credit. Hypothesis 1 is supported if
participants are more likely to include the uncertain costs described in the three
categories when they encounter a negative benefit surprise than when they encounter a
positive benefit surprise.12
Panel A of Table 2 provides the means for Category 1 for each of the four
experimental conditions and Panel B provides the analysis of variance (ANOVA). A
comparison of the row means shows that participants in the negative benefit surprise
condition report a mean likelihood of including Category 1 in the final R&D tax credit
calculation of 69.50, compared to a mean of 52.00 for participants in the positive benefit
surprise condition. This pattern of means is in the hypothesized direction, and an
examination of the ANOVA for Category 1 shows that SURPRISE has a significant
effect on participants’ likelihood ratings (p-value = 0.012). For Category 1, the
hypothesized effect of negative benefit surprise on tax professionals’ likelihood of
including uncertain positions is supported.
Table 3 provides the ANOVA results and means for the costs described in
Category 2. Panel A shows that participants in the negative benefit surprise condition
report a mean likelihood of including the position of 46.16, compared to a mean of 26.25
for participants in the positive benefit surprise condition. These results are also in the
hypothesized direction. The ANOVA for Category 2 shows that SURPRISE has a
significant effect on participants’ likelihood ratings (p-value = 0.010), providing
additional support for H1.

12

In addition to the tests I describe in this section, I also performed a MANOVA for all three categories.
The MANOVA shows that the main effect of SURPRISE is significant (p-value = 0.014) and the
interaction effect for SURPRISE and CONTRACT is also significant (p-value = 0.023).
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Table 2 – Analyses for Category 1
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Including the Uncertain Costs from Category 1
Contract Structure
Benefit
Surprise

Contingent Fee
Mean = 62.98
Std. dev. = 26.59
n=
13

Fixed Fee
Mean =
77.99
Std. dev. =
12.46
n=
10

Row Means
Mean =
69.50
Std. dev. =
22.52
n=
23

Positive

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

61.57
24.69
13

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

41.63
38.41
12

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

52.00
32.93
25

Column
Means

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

62.27
25.15
26

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

58.16
34.39
22

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

60.39
29.48
48

Negative

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Likelihood of Including Category 1

SURPRISE
CONTRACT
SURPRISE * CONTRACT
Error
Total

df
1
1
1
44
48

MS
4229.64
71.87
3622.49
759.58

F-statistic
5.568
0.095
4.769

p-value
0.012 *
0.760
0.017 *

Panel C: Additional Test of Hypotheses 2a & 2b
Planned Contrast
Interaction effect of SURPRISE and
CONTRACT
* One-tailed

t-statistic
2.86
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df p-value
44
0.004 *

Table 3 – Analyses for Category 2
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Including the Uncertain Costs from Category 2
Contract Structure
Benefit
Surprise
Negative

Positive

Column
Means

Contingent Fee
Mean = 35.17
Std. dev. = 35.14
n=
13

Fixed Fee
Mean =
60.45
Std. dev. =
28.17
n=
10

Row Means
Mean =
46.16
Std. dev. =
34.09
n=
23

Mean = 29.90
Std. dev. = 30.64
n=
13

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

22.30
29.04
12

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

26.25
29.52
25

Mean = 38.45
Std. dev. = 32.42
n=
26

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

39.64
34.06
22

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

35.79
33.02
48

MS
5593.16
926.33
3204.94
966.14

F-statistic
5.79
0.96
4.76

p-value
0.010 *
0.333
0.038 *

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Likelihood of Including Category 2

SURPRISE
CONTRACT
SURPRISE * CONTRACT
Error
Total

df
1
1
1
44
48

Panel C: Additional Test of Hypotheses 2a & 2b
t-statistic
2.79

Planned Contrast
Interaction effect of SURPRISE and
CONTRACT
* One-tailed
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df
44

p-value
0.004 *

While the conditions for an ANOVA are met for Categories 1 and 2, they are not
met for Category 3. Specifically, tests for homogeneity of variance and skewness show
that, for Category 3, the between-cell variances are significantly different (p-value <
0.05) and the underlying data is positively skewed (skewness-statistic = 4.295). Quinn
and Keough (2002) note that, while PROC GLM may be robust to violations of
homogeneity of variance, it may not be robust when the distribution is positively skewed.
In such circumstances, rank transformations of the response variable may be appropriate.
Therefore, I perform a rank-transformed (RT) ANOVA for Category 3. Table 4 reports
results for Category 3. Panel A shows that the row mean for participants in the negative
benefit surprise conditions were 7.12, compared to the row mean of 3.87 for participants
in the negative benefit surprise conditions.13 In Panel B, results for the RT ANOVA
show a significant effect of SURPRISE (p-value = 0.062).
Overall, these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. Participants
encountering a negative benefit surprise were more likely to take the uncertain tax
positions than participants experiencing a positive benefit surprise. This suggests that, in
addition to playing an important role when contracting for services (AICPA 2006), the
initial estimate is also an important factor in tax professionals’ judgments and
recommendations to clients.
Tests of Hypotheses 2a and 2b
Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict an interaction between CONTRACT and
SURPRISE. Hypothesis 2a is supported if participants who contract under a fixed fee
contract structure and encounter a negative benefit surprise are more likely to include

13

Participants were ranked from 1 (least aggressive) to 48 (most aggressive). The mean ranking for
participants in the negative (positive) benefit surprise conditions were 20.04 (13.08).
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Table 4 – Analyses for Category 3
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Including the Uncertain Costs from Category 3
Contract Structure
Benefit
Surprise

Contingent Fee
Negative
Mean = 2.72
Std. dev. = 5.77
n=
13

Fixed Fee
Mean =
12.85
Std. dev. =
25.44
n=
10

Row Means
Mean =
7.12
Std. dev. =
17.59
n=
23

Positive

Mean =
Std. dev. =

1.78
3.51

Mean =
Std. dev. =

3.87
8.10

n=

5.80
10.5
7
13

n=

12

n=

25

Column
Mean =
Means Std. dev. =
n=

4.26
8.49
26

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

5.77
17.77
22

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

3.87
13.45
48

Mean =
Std. dev. =

Panel B: Rank-Transformed ANOVA Results
Likelihood of Including Category 3
SURPRISE
CONTRACT
SURPRISE * CONTRACT
Error
Total

df
1
1
1
44
48

MS
763.38
335.33
1692.63
325.99

F-statistic
2.34
1.03
5.19

p-value
0.066 *
0.316
0.014 *

Panel C: Additional Test of Hypotheses 2a & 2b
Planned Contrast
Interaction effect of SURPRISE and
CONTRACT
* Onetailed

t-statistic
2.12
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df
44

p-value
0.020 *

uncertain costs in the final research credit than tax participants who contract under a
contingent fee contract structure and encounter a negative benefit surprise. Hypothesis
H2b is supported if participants who contract under a fixed fee structure and encounter a
positive benefit surprise are less likely to include uncertain costs in the final research
credit than tax participants who contract under a contingent fee structure and encounter a
positive benefit surprise (refer to Figure 1 for a visual representation of the hypothesized
interaction).
A visual examination of the means for each category of uncertain costs shows
results consistent with the hypothesized interaction. Figures 2-4 graph the mean
likelihood of including the uncertain costs for each category. For each category of cost,
participants who contract under a fixed fee structure and encounter a negative benefit
surprise are more likely to include uncertain costs in the final research credit than tax
participants who contract under a contingent fee and encounter a negative benefit
surprise. In addition, participants who contract under a fixed fee structure and experience
a positive benefit surprise are less likely to include uncertain costs in the final research
credit than tax participants who contract under a contingent fee structure and encounter a
positive benefit surprise.
The interaction between CONTRACT and SURPRISE is significant for Category 1 (pvalue = 0.017), Category 2 (p-value = 0.038), and Category 3 (p-value = 0.014). These
results provide strong support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. I also use planned contrast tests
to determine whether the pattern of the predicted interaction between CONTRACT and
SURPRISE is significant. I use a contrast code of 1, 2, -1, -2 for the contingent
fee/negative benefit surprise, fixed fee/negative benefit surprise, contingent fee/positive
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benefit surprise, and fixed fee/positive benefit surprise, respectively for each category of
costs (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). Panel C of Tables 2, 3, and 4 shows the results
of this test of the predicted pattern of cell means for Categories 1, 2, and 3. The contrast
is significant for all categories of uncertain costs. For Category 1, Table 2 reports a tstatistic of 2.885, one-tailed p-value = 0.004. For Category 2, Table 3 reports a t-statistic
of 2.786, one-tailed p-value = 0.004. For Category 3, Table 4 reports a t-statistic of
2.117, one-tailed p-value = 0.020.
These results provide robust support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Tax professionals
are more likely to include uncertain positions in tax returns when they are contracting
under a fixed fee and encounter a negative benefit surprise than when they are contracting
under a contingent fee and encounter a negative benefit surprise. In contrast, when
professionals contract under a fixed fee and encounter a positive benefit surprise, they are
less likely to include uncertain positions in tax returns than when they contract under a
contingent fee contract structure.
Test of Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicts a main effect of CONTRACT. H3 is supported if
professionals contracting under a contingent fee structure are more likely to inform the
client that a category of cost may not be upheld if challenged by the IRS. In analyzing
participants’ responses to the dependent measure for H3, I control for their responses to
the question asking whether they feel the tax professional has a responsibility to inform
the client about the position. Figure 5 displays participants’ means responses. Table 5
displays the results of the ANCOVAs. For Categories 1 and 2, participants assessments
of the professionals’ responsibility to inform the client were significant (p-values <0.001
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Figure 2 – Likelihood of Including the Costs from Category 1
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Figure 3 – Likelihood of Including the Costs from Category 2

65%

60.45%
55%
45%

Negative Benefit Surprise
35.17%

Positive Benefit Surprise

35%
25%

29.90%

22.30%

15%

Contingent Fee

Fixed Fee

32
	
  

Figure 4 – Panel A: Likelihood of Including the Costs from Category 3
15%	
  

12.85%
10%	
  

Negative Benefit Surprise

5.80%
5%	
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2.72%
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Panel B: Rank of Likelihood of Including the Costs from Category 3*
35
30

29.80

25
20

Negative Benefit Surprise

16.46

Positive Benefit Surprise

15
10

12.54

9.83

5
0
Contingent Fee

Fixed Fee

*Participants are ranked from 1 to 48, with a rank of 1 being assigned to the participant who is least likely
to include the costs from Category 3 and 48 being assigned to the participant who is most likely to include
the costs from Category 3.
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Figure 5 – Likelihood of Informing Client
Panel A: Category 1
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Panel B: Category 2
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Panel C: Category 3
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Table 5 – Communication
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Informing Client - Category 1
Contract Structure
Benefit
Surprise
Negative

Positive

Column
Means

Contingent Fee
Mean = 68.00
Std. dev. = 30.12
n=
12

Fixed Fee
Mean =
47.89
Std. dev. =
30.88
n=
9

Row Means
Mean =
59.38
Std. dev. =
31.38
n=
21

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

71.46
34.07
13

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

62.64
33.17
11

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

67.42
33.23
24

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

69.80
31.61
25

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

56.00
32.21
20

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

63.67
32.27
45

Panel B: ANOVA Results – Category 1
RESPONSIBILITY
SURPRISE
CONTRACT
SURPRISE * CONTRACT

df
1
1
1
1
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MS
22984.30
68.31
873.99
243.21

F-statistic
47.01
0.14
1.788
0.497

p-value
<0.001
0.711
0.095 *
0.485

Table 5 – Communication, Continued
Panel C: Mean Likelihood of Informing Client - Category 2
Contract Structure
Benefit
Surprise
Negative

Positive

Column
Means

Contingent Fee
Mean = 77.58
Std. dev. = 25.93
n=
12

Fixed Fee
Mean = 61.33
Std. dev. = 29.94
n=
9

Row Means
Mean =
70.62
Std. dev. =
28.22
n=
21

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

87.00
19.84
13

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

80.73
19.65
11

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

84.13
19.58
24

Mean =

82.48

Mean =

72.00

Mean =

77.82

Std. dev. =
n=

22.98
25

Std. dev. =
n=

26.05
20

Std. dev. =
n=

24.67
45

Panel D: ANOVA Results – Category 2

RESPONSIBILITY
SURPRISE
CONTRACT
SURPRISE * CONTRACT

df
1
1
1
1
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MS
4525.10
1117.69
1531.97
294.07

pF-statistic value
9.72
0.003
2.40
0.129
3.30
0.038 *
0.63
0.431

Table 5 – Communication, Continued

Panel E: Mean Likelihood of Informing Client - Category 3
Contract Structure
Benefit
Surprise
Contingent Fee
Fixed Fee
Row Means
Negative
Mean = 84.62
Mean =
93.56
Mean =
88.27
Std. dev. = 27.08
Std. dev. =
9.79
Std. dev. =
21.81
n=
13
n=
9
n=
22
Positive

Column
Means

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

94.31
13.73
13

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

87.50
18.76
12

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

91.04
16.36
25

Mean =

89.46

Mean =

90.10

Mean =

89.74

Std. dev. =
n=

21.60
26

Std. dev. =
n=

15.53
21

Std. dev. =
n=

18.94
47

Panel F: ANOVA Results – Category 3
RESPONSIBILITY
SURPRISE
CONTRACT
SURPRISE * CONTRACT

df
1
1
1
1

*One-tailed
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MS
172.23
16.12
0.75
623.19

F-statistic
0.46
0.044
0.002
1.69

p-value
0.499
0.836
0.482 *
0.201

and 0.003, respectively). For Categories 1 and 2, participants contracting under a
contingent fee structure are more likely to inform the client that uncertain positions may
not be upheld if challenged than participants contracting under a fixed fee. The mean
likelihood of informing the client when contracting under a contingent (versus fixed)
contract structure was 69.80 (versus 56.00) for Category 1 and 82.48 (versus 72.00) for
Category 2. An examination of the ANCOVAS for Category 1 and 2 show that these
differences are significant, with p-values of 0.095 and 0.038, respectively.
For Category 3, however, there was virtually no difference between levels of
CONTRACT. The mean likelihood of informing the client when contracting under a
contingent (versus fixed) contract structure was 89.46 (versus 90.10) for Category 3 –
indicating that participants in all conditions were highly likely to inform the client that
the uncertain position may not be upheld if challenged. Overall, these results provide
some support for Hypothesis 3. Controlling for participants’ perceptions of responsibility
to inform the client, participants contracting under a contingent fee structure were more
likely to inform the client that a position may not be supported if challenged.
Supplemental Analyses
Judgments of Support
In addition to the main analysis of the dependent variables for H1, H2a, and H2b
described above, I further explore the effect of CONTRACT and SURPRISE on tax
professionals’ behavior by examining participants’ answers to supplemental questions.
Participants were asked to rate the likelihood that “a Tax Court judge would allow the
treatment of each category of costs as qualifying research expenses.” For each category
of costs, participants responded on a scale from 0-100, with anchoring descriptions of
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“Definitely WOULD NOT Allow” and “Definitely WOULD Allow.” The three
categories of cost were intended to describe costs that were 55% (Category 1), 35%
(Category 2), and 0-5% (Category 3) likely to be upheld if challenged by a Tax Court
judge. I first examine the overall mean likelihood assessments for each category of cost.
The mean likelihood rating was 56.33% for Category 1, 33.41% for Category 2, and
7.81% for Category 3. None of the categories had an overall mean that differed
significantly from the intended calibrations. ANOVAs for participants’ judgments for
each category of variables show that there were not significant differences between
conditions (all p-values for the corrected models ≥ 0.619).
I next examine how participants’ likelihood of including each category of costs
differs from their assessments of support. For each category of cost, I subtract
participants’ assessments of support from their response to the dependent variable. For
example, assume that a participant rates the likelihood that the position would be
included in the credit to be 55% and their assessment of support is 45%. The difference
between these two responses is positive 10. Thus, a positive difference means that the
participants’ likelihood of including the position is higher than their assessment of
support for that position. Figure 6 displays the differences for the experimental
conditions.
For Categories 1, 2, and 3, participants who contract under a fixed fee and
encounter a negative benefit surprise have an average positive difference of 19.39, 18.75,
and 4.25, respectively. These differences are significantly different from zero for
Categories 1 and 2 (results not tabulated). Participants who contract under a fixed fee
and encounter a positive benefit surprise have an average difference of -6.28, -6.87, and -
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Figure 6 – Difference Between Judgments of Support and Likelihood of Including
Position
Panel A: Category 1
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1.55 for the three categories. These differences are only significant for Category 1
(results not tabulated). None of the mean differences were significant for participants
contracting under contingent fee structures.
Final Amount of the R&D Tax Credit
After participants rate the likelihood of including each of the categories of
uncertain cost in the tax return, they select the final R&D tax credit amount to report to
the client (FINAL). This choice task required participants to make one selection that
included the appropriate categories of cost. For ease of exposition, Table 6 reports
participants’ selections in the following manner. If participants selected a final amount
that included none of the uncertain positions, their response is coded as zero. Otherwise
it was coded a 1, 2, or 3 depending on how many categories of cost they included in their
final amount.14
Figure 7 shows the mean responses for the four experimental conditions. An examination
of the means shows that the results are consistent with the hypothesized interaction
between CONTRACT and SURPRISE. Participants who contract under a fixed fee and
encounter a negative benefit surprise reported a final amount to the client that included an
average of 1.80 uncertain positions, compared to 1.31 uncertain positions for
professionals who contract under a contingent fee and encounter a negative benefit
surprise.15 In addition, participants who contract under a fixed fee and encounter a

14

The experimental question allowed participants to select different combinations of the three categories.
For instance, participants could have selected categories 1 and 3, rather than 1 and 2. These responses are
coded equally as a 2 in the current analysis. Alternatively I analyze these responses by ranking each choice
in order of increasing aggression. Thus, because Category 3 is more aggressive than Category 2, a
participant who selected the combination of Category 1 and Category 3 would have selected a more
aggressive combination than a participant who selected a combination of Category 1 and Category 2.
Analyzing the results with the more descriptive rankings strengthens the results of the ANOVA, but does
not qualitatively change the interpretation thereof.
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positive benefit surprise reported a final amount to the client that included an average of
0.75 uncertain positions, compared to 1.31 uncertain positions for professionals who
contracted under a contingent fee and encounter a positive benefit surprise. ANOVA
results in Table 6, Panel B show that the hypothesized main effect of SURPRISE is
significant (one-tailed p-value = 0.009). In addition, the hypothesized interaction and
planned contrasts are also significant (one-tailed p-value = 0.009 and 0.002,
respectively). These results provide further support for Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b.
An examination of the overall results from this experiment provides additional
insight into the behavior of tax professionals. Participants who contract under a fixed fee
contract structure and encounter a negative benefit surprise are significantly more likely
than participants in all other conditions to include uncertain positions on returns.
Significantly, 80% of participants contracting under a fixed fee and encountering a
negative benefit surprise included Category 2 in the final R&D tax credit, even though
this position was rated as having less than a 40% probability of being upheld if
challenged (compared to less than 50% of the participants contracting under a contingent
fee). While this behavior may be readily identifiable as suboptimal from the perspective
of the IRS, aggressive behavior may not be the only form of suboptimal behavior.
Results also show that participants who contract under a fixed fee contract
structure and encounter a positive benefit surprise are significantly less likely than
participants in all other conditions to include Category 1 for which the overall mean level
of support was judged to be greater than 50%. Examination of the data shows that 40%
of the participants in that condition did not include any of the uncertain categories of cost

15

Only one participant chose to include all three categories of costs in the final R&D tax credit. That
participant contracted under a fixed fee and encountered a negative benefit surprise.
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Figure 7 – Final Number of Uncertain Positions Included in R&D Tax Credit
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Table 6 – Final Number of Uncertain Positions Reported to Client
Panel A: Mean Final Number of Uncertain Positions Reported to Client
Contract Structure
Benefit
Surprise

Contingent Fee
Mean = 1.31
Std. dev. = 0.75
n=
13

Fixed Fee
Mean =
1.80
Std. dev. =
0.63
n=
10

Row Means
Mean =
1.52
Std. dev. =
0.73
n=
23

Positive

Mean = 1.31
Std. dev. = 0.75
n=
13

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

0.75
0.75
12

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

1.04
0.79
25

Column
Means

Mean = 1.31
Std. dev. = 0.74
n=
26

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

1.23
1.13
22

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

1.27
0.79
48

Negative

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Final Number of Uncertain Positions Reported to Client
df
MS
SURPRISE
1
3.27
CONTRACT
1
0.01
SURPRISE * CONTRACT
1
3.27
Error
44
0.53
Total
48

F-statistic p-value
6.15
0.009 *
0.02
0.878
6.15
0.009 *

Panel C: Additional Test of Hypotheses 2a & 2b
Planned Contrast
Interaction effect of SURPRISE and
CONTRACT
* One-tailed

t-statistic
3.058
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df
44

p-value
0.002 *

in the final credit. This suggests that there may be circumstances where tax professionals
forgo supportable tax positions, resulting in overpayment of tax by their client.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This study makes several contributions to the growing literature on tax
professionals’ judgments and decision-making. This is the first study to empirically
examine the effect of contract structure and benefit surprise on tax professionals’
behavior. Contrary to claims made by regulators, results show that contingent fees do not
lead professionals to take unsupportable positions on returns. Rather, results demonstrate
that restricting contingent fee contracts actually increases the likelihood of aggressive
behavior by tax professionals when they encounter a negative benefit surprise. This
increase is especially pronounced for categories of cost that are less than 50% likely to be
sustained.
This study is also the first to examine whether contract structure affects tax
professionals’ likelihood of informing taxpayers that tax return positions may not be
supported if challenged. Reducing the amount of information provided to clients by the
tax professional may leave them unaware of aggressive positions taken on their returns
and, consequently, undermine a fundamental aspect of our income tax system – the
ability of taxpayers to accurately report their income. Reduced communication between
professionals and their clients may be especially significant given that taxpayers prefer
conservative tax positions (Hite and McGill 1992) but lack the expertise required to
identify an aggressive position and have been shown to follow both conservative and
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aggressive recommendations made by tax professionals (Newberry et al. 1993; Beck et
al. 1996).
Interpretation of the results of this study are subject to limitations common to
experiments. While the experiment discussed herein contained important contextual
factors, other factors may also affect tax professionals’ behavior. In addition,
experimental participants are experienced tax professionals who have expertise in
delivering R&D tax credit studies to clients. Professionals in other settings may not react
to the manipulated variables in the same manner. Finally, while experimental results
suggest that participants are highly likely to inform clients that uncertain positions may
not be supported if challenged, that likelihood was measured with a simultaneous
measure of perceived responsibility. It is possible that, absent the measure of perceived
responsibility, tax professionals would have reported a lower likelihood of informing the
client that positions may not be supported.
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